LABOR

LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-APPLICATION OF NLRA TO
PAROCHIAL SCHOOL EMPLOYERS VIOLATES RELIGION CLAUSES

Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB,
559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 1061
(1978).
OF FIRST AMENDMENT-Catholic

The Quigley Education Association (Quigley Association), in June
of' 1974, petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board)' seeking certification as the bargaining agent for lay
teachers employed by two private secondary schools in Chicago,
Illinois. 2 The schools are managed by the Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, a corporation controlled by the Roman Catholic Church. 3
One year later, the Community Alliance for Teachers of Catholic
High Schools (Community Alliance) similarly petitioned the Board,
seeking to unionize lay teachers at five Catholic high schools in Indiana. 4 These five schools are managed by the Diocese of Fort
I Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1113 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
434 U.S. 1061 (1978). The Board is charged with carrying out the provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act). National Labor Relations Act, §§ 9-10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159160 (1976). The Act authorizes "'[e]mployees ... to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
[and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing." Id. at § 7, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
2 Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1113 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
434 U.S. 1061 (1978). The Quigley Association is an auxiliary of the Illinois Education Association, which had intervened in the case. Id. The two schools involved are Quigley Seminary
North and Quigley Seminary South. Id. Although the Seventh Circuit refers to them as secondary schools, there is marked disagreement between the parties as to the exact nature of the
schools. In lower Board proceedings, Catholic Bishop of Chicago claimed that the schools were
"minor seminar[ies]" whose primary function was to prepare young men for the priesthood.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 220 N.L.R.B. 359, 359 (1975). The NLRB rejected this argument,
finding that admission to the Quigleys was no longer restricted to boys who intend to enter the
priesthood. Id. The Board pointed to the similarities in curriculum between the Quigleys and
other high schools and to the fact that only 16% of the Quigleys' 1974 graduates went on to the
seminary college of the diocese. Id.
In its brief of the United States Supreme Court, Catholic Bishop of Chicago pursued its
argument, attempting to show the religious importance of the Quigleys through a historical
summary of the seminary's role in the Church. Brief for Respondents at 3-6, NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, No. 77-752, cert. granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief
for the Employers]. The brief re-emphasized that the Quigleys' principal focus continues to be
the preparation of young men for the priesthood. Id. at 8-9.
3 Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1113 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
434 U.S. 1061 (1978).
1 Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1113-14 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978). The five schools are Huntington Catholic High School, South
Bend St. Joseph High School, Mishawaka Marian High School, Fort Wayne Bishop Luers High
School, and Fort Wayne Bishop Dwenger High School. Brief for the National Labor Relations
Board at 8 n.3, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, No. 77-752, cert. granted, 434 U.S. 1061
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the NLRB].
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Wayne-South Bend, Inc., likewise a corporation of the Roman
5
Catholic Church.
Separate representation hearings were held with respect to the
petitions 6 pursuant to section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or Act). 7 During the hearings, Catholic Bishop of Chicago and
Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc. (Employers) challenged the
assertion of jurisdiction on two grounds, arguing both that Board involvement violated the first amendment, 8 and that their schools failed
to satisfy the Board's minimum revenues standard. 9 The NLRB rejected the Employers' contentions relying upon its decision in a similar case, Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore. 10 There, the
employer's first amendment claim was dismissed based on the Board's
practice of asserting jurisdiction over "religiously associated" institutions while refusing to exercise jurisdiction over "completely religious" organizations." Additionally, the Board had held that a group of
5 Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1113-14 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978).
6 Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
434 U.S. 1061 (1978).
7 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976). Section 9(c) of the Act describes the necessary prerequisites for
a representation hearing. id.
8 Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
434 U.S. 1061 (1978). The first amendment of the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
9 See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978). The applicable regulation states that the Board will exercise
jurisdiction over nonprofit private colleges with yearly gross revenues exceeding $1,000,000.
29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1977). The Board, however, extended the regulation to private nondenominational secondary schools in 1971. Shattuck School, 189 N.L.R.B. 886 (1971). Recently,
the standard was applied to religiously operated high schools which otherwise met the requirements of the Act. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 249-50 (1975);
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1219 (1976).
To meet the $1,000,000 requirement, the operating budgets of the two Chicago schools, as
well as the budgets of the five Indiana schools had to be combined respectively. Brief for the
Employers, supra note 2, at 5 n.4, 10 n.10. The Board upheld this procedure on the authority of
Roman Catholic Archdiocese oj Baltimore where, in an analogous situation, it found that the
employer possessed a considerable amount of control over the schools, making consolidation for
jurisdictional purposes proper. Id. at 1114; see Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216
N.L.R.B. at 250.
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Employers did not challenge this determination and
the court merely noted that "the Board was within its statutory authority of selecting an
employer unit." Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1114 n.6 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978); see N.L.R.A. § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
10 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975), cited in Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112,
1114 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978). In Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
Baltimore, a labor organization petitioned the Board for union representation of lay teachers
employed by five private high schools owned by the archdiocese. 216 N.L.R.B. at 249.
11 216 N.L.R.B. at 250.
The schools in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore taught secular as well as religious
subjects, hence, they were held to be "religiously associated." Id. The "'completely
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schools could be consolidated in order to meet the $1,000,000
12
minimum revenues standard.
In decisions issued subsequent to the representation hearings,
the NLRB found the two groups to be appropriate bargaining units
and directed that elections be held.' 3 The Quigley Association and
the Community Alliance (Unions) won their respective elections and
the Board certified them as the bargaining agents for the lay
14
teachers.
Despite this certification, the Employers refused to enter into
collective bargaining with the Unions' representatives. 15 In December of 1975, separate unfair labor practice charges were filed
against the Employers. 16 In each instance, the Board issued complaints 17 charging the Employers with violating sections 8(a)(5) and
8(a)(1) of the Act.'
The Employers responded by challenging the
religious-merely religiously associated' standard," Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559
F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978), has evolved from recent
Board decisions as a separate jurisdictional criterion for private, nonprofit schools. See notes
47-68 infra and accompanying text. As an administrative agency of the government, the NLRB
possesses vast discretionary authority to formulate such jurisdictional rules on a case by case
basis. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,
394 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1969); SEC v. Chenerey Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). See generally
N.L.R.A. § 14(c), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976). Also, it has been held that the Board's jurisdictional standards are subject to judicial review only in extraordinary circumstances. NLRB v.
Carroll-Naslund Disposal, Inc., 359 F.2d 779, 780 (9th Cir. 1966); see NLRB v. W.B. Jones
Lumber Co., 245 F.2d 388, 391 (9th Cir. 1957).
12 216 N.L.R.B. at 249; see Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 223 N. L. R.B. 1218,
1219 (1976).
's Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1222 (1976); Diocese of Fort WayneSouth Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1226 (1976).
14 Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
434 U.S. 1061 (1978).
1' Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
434 U.S. 1061 (1978). The Employers' motive in refusing to bargain was to force a final Board
order from which they could appeal pursuant to section 10(f) of the Act. Id.; see N.L.R.A.
§ 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976).
16 Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1221 (1976); Diocese of Fort WayneSouth Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1226 (1976).
17 Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1221 (1976); Diocese of Fort WayneSouth Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1226 (1976). The Board is vested with the power to
prevent unfair labor practices. N.L.R.A. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). Section 10(b) of the
Act governs Board procedures for dealing with an unfair labor practice charge. 29 U.S.C. §
160(b) (1976). When a charge is filed with the NLRB, the Board or its agents are authorized to
serve a complaint against the person alleged to have committed the unfair labor practice. Id.
18 Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1221 (1976); Diocese of Fort WayneSouth Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1226 (1976). Section 8(a) of the Act establishes certain
types of employer conduct as unfair labor practices. N.L.R.A. § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976).
Under section 8(a)(1), "lilt
[is] an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section" 7 of the Act.
Id. § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Under section 8(a)(5) "[iut
[is] an unfair labor practice
for an employer .. .to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees."
Id. § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 7 accords employees the right to unionize and
"bargain collectively." Id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
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NLRB's jurisdiction on grounds essentially the same as those asserted
during the representation hearings. 19 The Board dismissed the
Employers' claims in both cases and granted motions for summary
judgment. 20 Addressing the first amendment issue specifically, the
Board held, inter alia, that applying the provisions of the Act does
not violate the religion clauses when there is only a minor interference with one's religious practices. 2 1 The Board ordered the
Employers to bargain with the Unions and to "[c]ease and desist
22
from" unfair labor activity.
The Employers sought appellate review of the NLRB's unfair
labor practice holding, pursuant to section 10(f) of the Act. 23 In
Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB,24 the Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding initially that the exercise of jurisdiction via the "'completely
religious-merely religiously associated' standard" amounted to a
'" Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1221-22 (1976); Diocese of Fort
Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1226 (1976). The Employers raised four objections to jurisdiction during the unfair labor practice proceedings. 224 N.L.R.B. at 1221; 224
N.L.R.B. at 1226. Each argued: that it was a nonprofit corporation managing catholic schools;
that none of its schools satisfied the NLRB's minimum jurisdictional standards; that its schools
had little commercial impact; and, that the first amendment prevented the Board from asserting
jurisdiction. 224 N.L.R.B. at 1221; 224 N.L.R.B. at 1226. Although it is not clear that all of
these specific objections were raised at the earlier representation hearings, the Board concluded
that none of the objections were subject to litigation in the unfair labor practice proceedings.
224 N.L.R.B. at 1222; 224 N.L.R.B. at 1227. In so doing, the Board adhered to its policy of
refusing to hear issues that "were or could have been" properly heard below. 224 N.L.R.B. at
1222; 224 N.L.R.B. at 1227.
20 Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1222 (1976); Diocese of Fort WayneSouth Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1227 (1976).
21 Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1222 (1976); Diocese of Fort WayneSouth Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1227 (1976); see Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los
Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1218 (1976). Relying on its decision in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, the Board in both cases declared that
(1) the purpose of the Act is to maintain and, facilitate the free flow of commerce
through the stabilization of labor relations; (2) the provisions of the Act do not
interfere with religious beliefs; and (3) regulation of labor relations does not violate
the first amendment when it involves a minimal intrusion of religious conduct and is
necessary to obtain that objective.
224 N.L.R.B. at 1222; 224 N.L.R.B. at 1227.
22 Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1224 (1976); Diocese of Fort WayneSouth Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1229 (1976).
2' Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
434 U.S. 1061 (1978). In an unfair labor practice proceeding, section 10(f) accords any losing
party the automatic right to appellate review of any final order of the Board. N.L.R.A. § 10(l),
29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976).
The Board cross-appealed for affirmance of its findings pursuant to section 10(e) of the Act.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1115. Section 10(e) provides the Board with
the right to petition the court of appeals for enforcement of itsdecree. N.L.R.A. § 10(e), 29
U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
24 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978).
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misapplication of the Board's discretionary powers.2 5 Further, the
court declared the NLRA inapplicable to the Employers, finding the
act of certification itself to be an unconstitutional infringement on
"the religious character of all parochial schools." 26 Of principal
concern was the belief that the collective bargaining order would chill
the bishops' freedom to govern "the religious mission" of the institu27
tions.
A major change in jurisdictional policy laid the groundwork for
the confrontation in Catholic Bishop.2 8 Prior to its 1970 decision in
Cornell University,2 9 the NLRB had refused to assert jurisdiction
over nonprofit colleges whose operations were essentially noncommercial and closely related to the schools' "'charitable and educational"' purposes.3 0 With Cornell as impetus, the Board systematically extended its jurisdictional arm to reach nonprofit sectarian
schools.31
The validity of the Board's decision to exercise jurisdiction over
nonprofit schools is unquestionable. 3 2 The NLRB's jurisdictional
power, except where specifically limited by the Act, 3 3 extends to all
labor disputes "affecting commerce." 3 4 The Supreme Court, in upId. at 1118, 1122-23. The Seventh Circuit evaluated the Board's findings in view of the
United States Supreme Court decisions in cases involving the religion clauses of the first
amendment. Id. at 1118-22. The court found that the Board gave no consideration to the impact of its decision on the Employers' first amendment rights. Id. at 1120.
2S Id. at 1123-24. The court felt that the Employers' authority would be impeded somewhat
by the Unions' right to confer on any employment decision concerning the schools. Id.
27 Id. at 1124. It was noted that the Employer would hesitate to make legitimate, religiously
motivated decisions adverse to the lay teachers' rights out of fear of long and costly confrontations with the Board. Id.
28 See Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). In Cornell, the Board exerted jurisdiction
over nonprofit private colleges for the first time. Id. at 334.
29 183 NL.R.B. 329 (1970).
30 Id. at 329.
31 See, e.g., 559 F.2d 1112; Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1977); Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975); Henry M. Hald High School Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 415
(1974).
32 See notes 33-36 infra and accompanying text.
33 N.L.R.A. § 2(2), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (3) (1976). Sections 2(2) and (3) of the Act
contain certain exclusions from the definitions of "employer" and "employee" as those words are
used in the Act. Id.
34 Id. at §§ 9(c)(1), 10(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c)(1), 160(a) (1976). In NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil
Corp.. the United States Supreme Court "declared that ... Congress intended to and did vest
in the Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce
Clause." 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963) (per curiam) (emphasis in original); see NLRB v. Fainblatt,
306 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1939).
At least one commentator has expressed uneasiness with the Supreme Court's statement in
Reliance Fuel. Comment, The Free Exercise Clause, The NLRA, and ParochialSchool Teachers,
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holding the constitutionality of the NLRA, acknowledged the discretionary quality of this authority, noting that it is for the Board to
decide in each instance whether given activities "affect commerce." 35 Hence, it is clear that the Board possesses wide ranging
power to determine when and where to exercise its jurisdictional pre36
rogative.
As a result of its discretionary authority, Board treatment of nonprofit institutions has varied since the NLRA's inception in 1935. 3 7 In
the years immediately following the passage of the Act, no jurisdictional standards or guidelines existed. Jurisdictional determinations
appeared to be based on subjective considerations,3 8 although major
emphasis was placed upon a nonprofit organizations dollar effect on
commerce. 39 The legislative history of the 1947 amendments to 40
the
Act established the framework for the first change in this policy.
126 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 638 (1978). The author points out that the scope of the commerce
clause is much broader now than it was at the time the Act was passed. Id.
However, another law review article points out that the Supreme Court has interpreted
legislation passed pursuant to the commerce clause in accordance with current perceptions of
that power, disregarding its acknowledged limits at the time the law was passed. Sherman &
Black, The Labor Board and the Private Nonprofit Employer: A Critical Examination of the
Board's Worthy Cause Exemption, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1323, 1335-36 (1970).
35 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 32 (1937).
3 NLRB v. Carroll-Naslund Disposal, Inc., 359 F.2d 779, 780 (9th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. W.
B. Jones Lumber Co., 245 F.2d 388, 391 (9th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Townsend, 185 F.2d 378,
383 (9th Cir. 1950). Note, however, that the Board may not arbitrarilyrefuse to assert jurisdiction over an entire class of employers not specifically excluded by the Act. Hotel Employees
Local 255 v. NLRB, 358 U.S. 99, 99 (1958); Office Employees Int'l Union Local 11 v. NLRB,
353 U.S. 313, 318 (1957); Council 19, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Municipal Employees v.
NLRB, 296 F. Supp. 1100, 1104-05 (N.D. I11.
1968). The Board may decline to assert "jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis " where the purposes of the Act would not be served, but it may not
create "a blanket rule" excluding all employers of a class. 353 U.S. at 318.
37 See notes 38-68 infra and accompanying text.
38 See cases cited in note 39 infra. Jurisdictional decision-making remained totally
discretionary until 1950, when the Board fashioned its first jurisdictional standards. See, e.g., In
re Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635, 636 (1950).
39 E.g., In re Central Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 44 N.L.R.B. 533 (1942), enforced,
145 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945); In re American Medical Ass'n,
39 N.L.R.B. 385, 387-88 (1942); In re Christian Bd. of Publication, 13 N.L.R.B. 534, 537, 546
(1939), enforced, 113 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1940). Board inquiry was usually restricted to financial
aspects of the employer's operations, including one or more of the following: gross revenues; total
intrastate and interstate purchases; interstate sales. E.g., Central Dispensary, 44 N.L.R.B. at 533; In
re American Medical Ass'n, 39 N.L.R.B. at 387-88; In re Christian Bd. of Publication, 13
N.L.R.B. at 537, 546. But see In re Hyde Park Coop. Soc'y, Inc., 73 N.L.R.B. 1254 (1947)
(substantial dollar effect ignored, jurisdiction denied).
40 The House of Representatives proposed an amendment to section 2(2) eliminating from
the definition of "employer" a large class of nonprofit enterprises, including religious and educational institutions. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, Legislative
History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at 34 (1948). Congress rejected the
proposal in favor of a more limited Senate version which excluded only nonprofit hospitals from

1978]

NOTES

The effect of these legislative developments on Board jurisdictional policy surfaced in the Trustees of Columbia University 41 decision in 1951. There, the Board refused to assert jurisdiction over
Columbia University despite acknowledgment that Columbia had a
dollar effect on commerce sufficient to fulfill the normal jurisdictional
requirements. 4 2 It was indicated that Congress, in the House Conference Report on the 1947 amendments to the NLRA, favored the
assertion of jurisdiction over nonprofit institutions only where their
activities are "'purely commercial."' 4 3 The Board found that Cothe definition. See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136, 137
(1947). The House Conference Report on the Labor Management Relations Act stated that the
broader House version was unnecessary because nonprofit organizations were covered by the
Act only "in exceptional circumstances [involving] purely commercial activities." H.R. Rep. No.
510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, at 536 (1948).
It has been suggested that the Supreme Court might decline to apply the NLRA to
employers of the type found in Catholic Bishop, based on one possible interpretation of the
above-quoted language from the House Conference Report. See Comment, supra note 34, at
639-40. In this regard, it has been proposed "that Congress [in the House Conference Report]
may not have intended to extend the Act to parochial schools regardless of whether it had the
constitutional power to do so." Id. at 640. The author intimated that should the Court adopt
this construction, it may follow a past practice-avoid the constitutional issue and decide the
case on a narrow interpretation of congressional purpose. Id.; see National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Congress' attempt to apply Fair Labor Standards Act to states held
violative of 10th amendment). It was pointed out that in McCullough v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), the Court refused to apply the NLRA to the
owners of foreign ships operating in United States waters. Comment, supra note 34, at 640
n.50. The Court held that where jurisdiction was likely to have an effect on international relations, the Act was not applicable absent clear congressional intent to the contrary. 372 U.S. at
21-22. Thus, it was noted that a Supreme Court decision based upon the suggested interpretation of congressional intent could effectively evade the constitutional issue posed by the Board's
attempted exercise of jurisdiction over the religious institutions. Comment, supra note 34, at
640.
A Supreme Court decision in Catholic Bishop grounded on this proposed statutory interpretation would seem inappropriate for a number of reasons. First, such a decision would be
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's previous interpretation of' the Board's jurisdictional authority. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text. Second, the particular section of the
House Conference Report was apparently not intended as a statement of congressional intent at
all but more likely an attempt by the House to "sav[e] face" after yielding to the Senate's
proposed amendment to section 2(2). NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550, 554-55 (1st Cir.
1975); see Sherman & Black, supra note 34, at 1331-37. Third, McCullough is easily distinguishable from the situations present in Catholic Bishop. The cases under consideration in
Catholic Bishop do not involve such extraordinary considerations as an impact on international
relations. The Board has merely asserted jurisdiction based on its finding that the operations of
the religious Employers affect commerce in the same manner as the activities of thousands of
secular employers in this country. See 559 F.2d at 1114.
41 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).
42 Id. at 425. The Board noted that Columbia University earned $117,000 as rental income
in the year ending June 30, 1950. Id. at 425 n.2. This amount alone equalled 234 percent of its
then current jurisdictional standard. Id.
43 Id. at 427; see note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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lumbia's activities were essentially noncommercial and closely related
to the school's "charitable ... and educational" purposes. 4 4 The
"purely commercial" test announced in Columbia governed Board
decisions involving nonprofit institutions for the next nineteen
years. 45 The NLRB declined jurisdiction over religious and other
nonprofit institutions where activities were found to be something
46
less than "purely commercial."
A second major change in policy was announced in 1970 when
the Board decided the Cornell case. 4 7 Cornell and Syracuse Universities submitted representation petitions 48 requesting that the Board
overrule its decision in Columbia.4 9 The NLRB complied, stressing
that neither the 1947 amendments nor the House Conference Report
prohibited it from asserting its discretionary power. 51 Further, the
Board cited the 1959 amendments to the Act as congressional approval of the NLRB's power to assert "jurisdiction [over] any class of

44 97 N.L.R.B. at 427. The grounds for the Board's findings were obscured by the court's
summary treatment of the case. See id. at 425-27. It was merely noted that Columbia, whose
main objective was the promotion of education, was a nonprofit institution with revenues obtained primarily from student payments and gifts. Id. at 425. For a criticism of the Columbia
decision and subsequent Board policy as to nonprofit institutions, see Sherman & Black, supra
note 34, at 1338-51.
45 See Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. at 334, overruling Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97
N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).
16 United States Book Exch., Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 1028, 1029 (1967) (organization found to be
important element of educational structure); see University of Miami, Inst. of Marine Science
Div., 146 N.L.R.B. 1448, 1451 (1964) (institution's activities "primarily educational rather than
commercial"); YMCA of Portland, Ore., 146 N.L.R.B. 20, 22 (1964) (organization's "nonprofit,
charitable, and religiously oriented activities . . . are noncommercial in nature"); Lutheran
Church, Mo. Synod, 109 N.L.R.B. 859, 860 (1954) (religious organization's radio station, without earned income, considered "noncommercial"). But see Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst.,
143 N.L.R.B. 568, 569-74 (1963) (school's exploratory activities helpful to private industry,
primarily commercial in nature); Disabled Am. Veterans, Inc. (Idento Tag Operation), 112
N.L.R.B. 864, 866 (1955) (manufacture and sale of identification tags similar to commercial
enterprise).
47 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970); see notes 48-52 infra and accompanying text.
48 183 N.L.R.B. at 329. A petition was also submitted on behalf of library employees at
Cornell. Id.
Historically, the nonprofit educational employer has challenged Board jurisdiction. See,
e.g., University of Miami, Inst. of Marine Science Div., 146 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1964). Cornell was
atypical in this respect.
49 183 N.L.R.B. at 329. The universities contended that their schools "have an overwhelming impact and effect on interstate commerce." Id. Detailed financial data was submitted by
both schools in support of the claim. Id.
50 1d. at 331. The only jurisdictional restriction in the 1947 amendments, the Board observed, concerned nonprofit hospitals. Id. at 331. In the Board's opinion, the House Report did
not flatly preclude NLRB jurisdiction over other nonprofit employers because Congress knew
that the Board's power was discretionary and subject to change. Id.
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employers whose operations substantially affect commerce." 5 1 The
Board concluded that the schools involved "ha[d] a substantial effect
on commerce," hence, the exercise of jurisdiction was justified under
52
the Act.
Subsequent to Cornell, the NLRB asserted jurisdiction over the
Christian Science Church, a nonprofit religious employer which published a daily newspaper and received substantial revenues from real
estate holdings. 53 The church argued that it was a noncommercial
enterprise and that the paper's goal was the dissemination of' news
from a Christian Science perspective. 54 In the opinion of the Board,
however, the paper was similar to other nonsectarian newspapers. 55
The church's first amendment objections to jurisdiction were rejected, the Board finding a compelling "societal interest" in carrying
out the provisions of the Act. 5 6 The exercise of' jurisdiction was
based on the significant revenues from the newspaper and real estate
businesses, the operations of which were found to be commercial in
57
nature.

51 Id. at 331. In the 1959 amendments, Congress passed section 14(c) of the NLRA which
statutorily sanctioned the Board's authority to refuse jurisdiction where it sees fit. LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, 541-42
(1959). The Board interpreted this section as further congressional buttressing of its discretionary power. 183 N.L.R.B. at 332. For a discussion of the primary aims of section 14(c) as part of
the 1959 amendments, see 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSuRE ACT OF 1959, at 422 (1959).

52 183 N.L.R.B. at 334. The Board noted particularly that private colleges as a class have a
massive economic impact on commerce. Id.

at 332.

In the wake of Cornell, the Board promulgated a minimum revenues jurisdictional standard
for nonprofit colleges which was quickly expanded to cover private nondenominational secondary schools. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1977); Windsor School, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 991 (1972); Shattuck School, 189 N.L.R.B. 886 (1971).
53 First Church of Christ, Scientist, 194 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1006-07 (1972).
54 Id. at 1008. In publishing its newspaper, the church utilized "a constructive approach to
articles of general interest." Id. at 1006. The Board found the paper's articles primarily nonreligious but did note that at least one religious article appeared daily. Id.
55 See id. The Board observed that "[t]he Christian Science Monitor is a general circulation
newspaper." Id. The paper contained general news and advertising, plus the standard "features
[of a daily paper such] as a sports section [and a] financial section." Id.
56 Id. at 1007-08. The church alleged that the exercise of jurisdiction would cause "excessive
• . . entanglement" with its operations, resulting in violations of its "free exercise" rights. Id. at
1007. The Board defended its right to assert jurisdiction, pointing to Supreme Court decisions
upholding the regulation "of conduct based on religious beliefs" where necessary "for the protection of society." Id.; see e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
57 194 N.L.R.B. at 1009. The revenues from the Christian Science Monitor exceeded
$1,000,000 per year and the rental income from the real estate exceeded $500,000 per year. Id.
The annual revenues of each operation exceeded the Board's minimum jurisdictional standard
for that type of business. Id. at 1009 & n.14.
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The Board qualified its Cornell ruling in May of' 1974, when it
refused to exercise jurisdiction over two Jewish educational organizations. 5 In Board of Jewish Education,5 9 the NLRB ruled that the
operations of* the organization were noncommercial and closely associated with its sectarian activities. 60 Subsequently, the Board
summarily dismissed an unfair labor practice charge filed against the
61
United Hebrew Schools of* Metropolitan Detroit.
A group of' lay teachers employed at a religiously operated high
school were accorded union recognition later that year. 62 One of the
employers in Henry M. Hald High School Association 63 had charged
that Board jurisdiction might result in "'excessive entanglement"'
with the schools.64 The Board accepted the rationale of its administrative law judge that no law required lay teachers to forego rights
granted to them under the Act simply because they worked for a
65
religious employer.
The NLRB solidified its position regarding religiously affiliated
schools in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore 66 and sub-

5s Board of Jewish Educ., 210 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1974); Association of Hebrew Teachers of
Metropolitan Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1974).
59 210 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1974).
60 Id. at 1037. The institution provided religious instruction to secondary school students.
Id. The employer's annual revenues were less than one-third of the Board's minimum standard
for private schools. See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1977). The Board declared that in deciding
Cornell, it did not anticipate exercising jurisdiction over this type of noncommercial religious
institution. 210 N.L.R.B. at 1037.
61 Association of Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1974). The
employer conducted educational programs for nursery, elementary, high school, and college
students. Id. at 1056-57. There was nothing special about the nursery school except that it
taught the Hebrew alphabet. Id. at 1057. The college was accredited only to award degrees in
Hebrew literature. Id. Elementary and high school classes were conducted after regular school
hours; although the courses were not considered religious, their goal was a better comprehension of Judaism. Id. at 1056-57, 1058.
The employer met the NLRB's minimum revenues standard for nonprofit schools. Id. at
1053. The Board, however, approved the findings of its administrative law judge that the evidence did not warrant a conclusion that the employer was part of a large class whose activities
were likely to substantially effect commerce. See id. at 1058-59.
62 Henry M. Hald High School Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 415, 418-19 (1974).
63 Id.
614Id. at 418 n.7. The claim was based on anticipated " 'bargaining orders, cease and desist
orders' " and mandatory elections. Id.
65 Id. The law judge observed "that the Hald Association projected itself and intruded into
the secular world and choose [sic] to entangle itself in secular affairs when it employed lay
teachers." Id. The opinion added that "[n]either the Act nor the United States Constitution"
mandates relinquishment of congressionally rooted section 7 privileges. Id.
66 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975); see notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text.
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sequent decisions. 67 In Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore,
the Board announced its policy of asserting jurisdiction over "religiously associated" institutions while refusing jurisdiction over "completely religious" organizations. 68
A common thread running through cases in which jurisdiction
was asserted over catholic schools is the employers' first amendment
objections. 69 The sectarian institutions have repeatedly contended
that jurisdiction would unconstitutionally entangle the Board with the
70
religious operations of their schools.
The United States Supreme Court has decided numerous first
amendment cases involving religiously operated institutions. 71 In determining the constitutionality of government regulations challenged
on establishment clause grounds, the Court applies a three-pronged
test. 7 2 To be constitutionally acceptable the regulation "must have a
secular legislative purpose, must have a principal or primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion." 7 3 Based on this

67 See Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1977); Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976).
68 216 N.L.R.B. at 250; see note 11 supra and accompanying text.
69 See Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. 1178, 1178 (1977); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1218 (1976); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. at 250; Henry M. Hald, 213 N.L.R.B. at 418.
70 See note 69 supra. During the relatively short period of time in which the Board has
asserted jurisdiction over Roman Catholic schools, several clashes have ensued. See Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 236 N.L.R.B. No. 3 (1978); Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn,
222 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1976); Henry M. Hald, 216 N.L.R.B. at 512. For example, in February of
1975, the Board dismissed an unfair labor practice charge against the Hald Association, finding
insufficient evidence to support the claim of discharge due to union activities. Henry M. Hald,
216 N.L.R.B. at 515a. The next year, the Board ignored the recommendations of its administrative law judge and ordered the Diocese of Brooklyn to rehire a teacher whose contract had
expired. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 222 N.L.R.B. at 1056, 1058. At the hearing
before the law judge, the employer introduced evidence demonstrating that the decision not to
rehire was based on religious and work related reasons. Id. at 1066-67. Consequently, the law
judge concluded that there was "insufficient [evidence] to support" the union's charge of termination for union activity. Id. at 1067. The Board, however, found the decision not to rehire
was motivated in substantial part by [the employee's] union activities." Id. at 1057.
71 See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Activities v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The court in Catholic Bishop based
much of its reasoning on the principles announced in this line of cases. 559 F.2d at 1118-26.
72 See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977).
73 Id. at 236; see Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976); Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Activities v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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test, the Court has invalidated various state statutes which had pro74
vided for financial assistance to religiously affiliated schools.
The Board's reasoning, when choosing to elaborate on the
religious employers' first amendment claims, 7 5 has been based on
Supreme Court decisions involving the free exercise clause.7 6 In free
exercise cases, the Court has recognized permissible regulation of
religiously motivated conduct, when justified by a valid social interest. 7 7 The Seventh Circuit a6knowledged this analysis, but refused to recognize its applicability to the facts of Catholic Bishop.78
74 In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), statutes which provided nonpublic school
students with transportation for field trips and loaned educational materials and equipment were
found unconstitutional; their primary effect was religious advancement. Id. at 248-55. However,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of statutes which provided for textbook loans, standardized testing, health services, and remedial therapy to the students. Id. at 236-48. These statutes
were found to have a secular purpose that neither inhibited nor advanced religion and it was
not thought that their administration would excessively entangle government with religion. See
id.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the constitutionality of statutes enacted in two
states was before the Court. Id. at 606. Pennsylvania's statutory scheme authorized state reimbursement to private schools teaching secular classes, while a Rhode Island statute provided
wage subsidies directly to private school teachers. Id. at 606-07. The Court found both statutes
to be violative of the third prong of the establishment clause test, holding that the statutes
invited excessive entanglement between the states and the schools. Id. at 613-14; see Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (statute providing loan of educational materials and equipment to private schools unconstitutional, principal effect was advancement of religion; statute providing
health and educational testing services to private school children at private schools unconstitutional, need for state surveillance to assure no religious advancement by administrators of tests
would involve excessive entanglement); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Activities v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (three state provisions authorizing funds to sectarian schools "for
. . .'maintenance and repair of. . . facilities;' " tuition refunds to parents of private school students; and income tax deductions to parents of private school students declared unconstitutional
as advancing religion). But see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (statutes providing tax
exemptions to religious institutions does not establish religion or cause excessive entanglement,
constitutionality upheld); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (statute providing
textbook loans to students in public and private schools does not violate the establishment or
free exercise clause).
75 See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976); First Church
of Christ, Scientist, 194 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1972).
76 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961),
77 In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court stated that religious freedom
consists of "freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Id. at 303-04.
Recently, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court acknowledged that regulation of religion-based conduct may be justified only by a compelling state interest. Id. at 215.
However, the Court noted that any challenge to a "reasonable state regulation" must be based
on religious beliefs before any first amendment claim may be asserted. Id.
78 559 F. 2d at 1124. The effect of the order to bargain collectively was seen as unconstitutionally inhibiting the Employers' "free exercise" rights. Id.
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The court of appeals commenced its analysis of the NLRB's
assertion of jurisdiction over the religious Employers by sharply
criticizing the "'completely religious-merely religiously associated"'
criterion. 79 The formula was termed "a simplistic black or white,
purported" standard, 80 amounting in effect to "a per se rule" which
automatically subjected certain religious schools to the constraints of
the NLRA. 8 1 It was thought that any judicially acceptable decision
which rendered an institution "completely religious" would require
an analysis of religious principles. 82 Since the NLRB omitted any
religious inquiry, the court found the standard inappropriate for use
in determining when to exert jurisdiction.8 3 Further, the court observed that if such religious scrutiny were to be utilized by the
Board, first amendment difficulties would almost certainly arise. 84
Because of the first amendment issue involved, the court of appeals found it proper to contrast the Board's standard against the religion clause cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 85
Reference was made to the Supreme Court's admonitions that government remain neutral towards all religions. 86 Walz v. Tax Commission8 7 was quoted, wherein the Court acknowledged the importance of making "value judgment[s]" as to the effect government
regulation is likely to have on religion, i.e., whether it would "'establish
or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of

'9 Id. at 1118. The Seventh Circuit consolidated the Quigley seminaries and the Indiana
schools for purposes of its analysis. Id. at 1114 n.5. The court acknowledged that the Quigley
schools were more religious than their Indiana counterparts, but made no distinction in its
analysis since it concluded that the NLRA could not constitutionally be applied to either group
of religiously affiliated schools. Id.
" Id. at 1112. The court found nothing in the standard indicating "where 'completely religious' takes over or, on the other hand, ceases." Id.
81 Id. at 1118-20. The court observed that once religious employers acknowledge that they
offer secular courses, "it becomes definitionally impossible .. .to establish that the institutions
can be anything else but 'merely religiously associated.' " Id. at 1119.
82

Id. at 1118,

83 See id.
84 Id. The court declared that "courts and agencies would be hard pressed to take official or
judicial notice that [the religious purposes of the schools] were undermined or eviscerated by
the determination to offer . .. secular subjects." Id.
85

Id. at 1118-20.

86 Id. at 1119. The recent decisions in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Activities v.

Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), and Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), were cited as
evidence of the Court's mandate. 559 F.2d at 1119-20. The Supreme Court has emphasized the
need " 'to maintain an attitude of 'neutrality', neither 'advancing' nor 'inhibiting' religion.' " Id.
at 1119 (quoting Conitnittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Activities v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788).
87 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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doing so." 8 8 Relying on the dictates of' Walz, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the Board had mistakenly failed to consider the impact
of its standard on freedom of religion. 8 9 Alluding to a group of first
amendment decisions involving parochial schools, the court observed
that the NLRB's "'religiously associated"' classification was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's characterizations of such institutions.9"
Under the Board's standard, it was noted, schools which the Supreme
Court had found "'pervasively sectarian"' were semantically transformed into "'merely religiously associated"' organizations. 9 1 Based
on precepts announced in both the "neutrality" and "parochaid" decisions, the Seventh Circuit was prepared to declare the "completely
religious-religiously associated" standard void as "an abuse of the
92
Board's discretion."
The Supreme Court has declared "that .. .Congress intended to

and did vest in the Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the commerce clause." 9 3 It is also recogs 559 F.2d at 1120 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (emphasis in
original)).
89 See 559 F.2d at 1120. The court deduced that the Board had neglected to make any value
judgments since it recognized that to do so would ,require a determination of the religiosity of
each Employer. Id. However, it was held that the Board could not simply ignore the religious
issue and assert jurisdiction without considering the first amendment protections of the religious
Employers. Id.
90 Id. at 1119. The opinion cited a number of recent first amendment cases concerning the
constitutionality of state statutes providing financial assistance to religiously operated schools.
Id. In the line of decisions collectively referred to by the Seventh Circuit as the "parochaid
cases," id., the Supreme Court invalidated several statutes, finding that aid could not be constitutionally provided to the "religion-pervasive institutions." Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
366 (1975); see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977) ("sectarian institutions"); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Activities v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774 (1973) ("religionoriented institutions"); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472,
476 (1973) ("fc]hurch-sponsored ... schools"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971)
("substantial[ly] religious ... schools").
91 559 F.2d at 1119. The court, in referring to the Board's "per se rule," stated that
[t]he total inability of the employers to overcome what appears to be an irrebuttable
presumption in practical operation makes more understandable the complaint of the
employers that the Board is cruelly whipsawing their schools by holding that institutions too religious to receive governmental assistance are not religious enough to be
excluded from its regulation.
Id. at 1119. For further discussion of this rationale, see notes 156-59 infra and accompanying
text.
92 559 F.2d at 1122-23. The Board had argued alternatively, that rejection of its discretionary standard would necessitate the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over all sectarian schools. Id.
at 1123. For a general discussion of the Board's jurisdictional power, see notes 33-36 supra and
accompanying text. Consequently, the court felt compelled to examine the broader first
amendment issue-the constitutionality of applying the NLRA's provisions to the religious
Employers. 559 F.2d at 1123; see notes 116-24 infra and accompanying text.
93 NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963) (per curiam) (emphasis in
original).
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nized that the extent to which the NLRB chooses to exercise this
authority is generally a matter of its informed discretion, subject to
judicial review only under "extraordinary circumstances, such as unjust discrimination." 9 4 The court of appeals obviously felt that the
application of the "completely religious-religiously associated" standard had a prejudicial effect on the Employers, "sufficiently extraordinary" to warrant judicial review. 95 An examination of the origin
of the dichotomous standard and the manner in which it is applied,
however, does not appear to support this finding.
The "completely religious-religiously associated" standard was
announced in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore wherein the
Board attempted to clarify its jurisdictional policy towards religiously
affiliated employers. 96 Prior to this decision, the NLRB had exercised jurisdiction over a Catholic school employer whose operations
met the $1,000,000 minimum revenues standard for private schools,
but had declined jurisdiction over two Jewish educational institutions. 97 One of the Jewish employers failed to meet the Board's
minimum revenues standard and was deemed to be a noncommercial
religious institution. 98 The other met the standard but was found to
be "an atypical employer;" not representative of a class whose operations were likely to have a substantial effect on commerce. 99 The
rationale of those decisions became clear when the Board exercised
jurisdiction over the religious employer in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore. 10 0 There, the distinction was made between "religiously associated" employers who offer a complete secular education and "completely religious" employers who provide primarily
religious instruction.101 The religious dichotomy was apparently an at-

9" NLRB v. Carroll-Naslund Disposal, Inc., 359 F.2d 779, 780 (9th Cir. 1966); see NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 32 (1937). The types of standards which the Board
chooses to develop and the definitional limits placed on them are matters ordinarily within the
Board's jurisdictional prerogative. See 359 F.2d at 780.
95 559 F.2d at 1118-19.
96

Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. at 250.

97 Henry M. Hald, 213 N.L.R.B. at 415 (jurisdiction asserted); Board of Jewish Educ., 210

N.L.R.B. at 1037 (jurisdiction denied); Association of Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit,
210 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1053 (1974) (jurisdiction denied).
98 Board of Jewish Educ., 210 N.L.R.B. at 1037.
99 Association of Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1058-59
(1974).
100 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975).
105 Id. The Board referred to its past practice of "declin[ing] jurisdiction over similar institutions only when they are completely religious, not just religiously associated." Id. at 250. Since
the employer offered secular as well as religious instruction to students, its operations were
classified as "religiously associated." Id.
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tempt by the Board to differentiate between the perceived large scale
business activities of Catholic schools as a class and the much smaller
operations of the Jewish educational organizations.10 2 This dichotomous criterion, seemingly based solely on the size of an employer's
business operations, is clearly within the NLRB's discretionary authority. 103
Implicit in the Seventh Circuit's criticism of the standard was the
feeling that the NLRB broadly classified the Employers without engaging in any religious inquiry. 10 4 There is no indication, however,
that the Board intended its religious characterizations to have any
significance outside of the limited jurisdictional context in which they
were used. 10 5 The NLRB, through its dichotomous standard has
merely distinguished between two markedly different types of religious employers. 10 6 No religious significance seems to have been
contemplated by the Board, consequently the failure to engage in
doctrinal analysis appears fully justified.
The Catholic Bishop court's finding that the Board mistakenly
failed to consider the effect its standard would have on the
Employers' first amendment rights necessarily rested on the presumption that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate the
Employers' religious freedoms. 10 7 This presupposed violation of the
Supreme Court's "neutrality" doctrine does not seem warranted. The
NLRA is a religiously neutral set of government regulations. 10 8 The
exercise of jurisdiction merely requires that the Employers' and the
Unions' representatives bargain collectively with respect to certain

102

See text accompanying note 99 supra. In the Board's opinion, the operations of the

Catholic employer, serving as the functional equivalent to public school education, were of
sufficient magnitude to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. See 216 N.L.R.B. at 250.
103 See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text.
104 See 559 F.2d at 1118.
105 See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1218-19
(1976); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. at 249-50. Board of Jewish
Educ., 210 N.L.R.B. at 1037. In these cases, the Board apparently employed religious descriptions in the same manner that it might use expressions such as "nonprofit" or "charitable" to
describe the extent of an employer's commercial activities. See 223 N.L.R.B. at 1218-19; 216
N.L.R.B. at 249-50; 210 N.L.R.B. at 1037. Nowhere is it clear that the Board attempted to
classify the employers in a strictly religious sense. See 223 N.L.R.B. at 1218-19; 216 N.L.R.B.
at 249-50; 210 N.L.R.B. at 1037.
s06 Compare Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976) and
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975) (jurisdiction asserted) with
Board of Jewish Educ., 210 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1974) and Association of Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1974) (jurisdiction denied).
107 559 F.2d at 1119-20.
108 See N.L.R.A. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
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mandatory subjects of employment. 10 9 This requirement does not
appear to violate either of the religion clauses of the first amendment,
hence the assertion of jurisdiction through the "completely
religious-religiously associated" standard does not constitute a
breach of religious neutrality. 110
Finally, in holding the Board's standard inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's religious designations, the court of' appeals "mis[took] the form in which [the expression] was cast for the substance of
the [expression].""
The schools in the "parochaid" cases were described as "religiously pervasive" because of the perceived impossibility of' separating the secular aspects of' education from the religious
purposes of' the institutions. 1 1 2 The degree to which religion pervaded the secular education was crucial to the Court's decisions that
certain forms of financial aid could not be provided to the schools
without unconstitutionally advancing religion or excessively entangling the state in church affairs. 113 The findings that the schools were
"religiously pervasive," though, applied solely to the factual situations
under consideration."14 In applying its "completely religiousreligiously associated" standard, the Board has concerned itself with
the size of the Employers' business activities disregarding the degree
to which religion pervades the institutions." 5 It follows that the
Employer may consistently be classified as "religiously associated" for
Board jurisdictional purposes but "religiously pervasive" for purposes
of considering the constitutionality of financial aid statutes.
As a result of the contention that invalidation of the "completely
religious-religiously associated" standard would force the Board to
exercise "jurisdiction over all religious schools," the court proceeded
to consider the constitutionality of' applying the provisions of' the

109 Id. § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). The mandatory subjects of bargaining are "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." Id.
110 For a discussion of the constitutional repercussions of jurisdiction, see notes 116-55 infra
and accompanying text.
111 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950).
112 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975); see note 90 supra.

I" See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Activities v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt
v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman,

403 U.S. 602 (1971).
114 The Supreme Court has not declared that its religious descriptions of Catholic schools in
the "parochaid" cases are applicable in every judicial proceeding involving parochial schools.
115 See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1218-19
(1976); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. at 249-50.
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NLRA to the religious Employers. 116 The three judge panel unanimously agreed that the Board's fundamental grant of union authorization, with the accompanying order to bargain collectively, amounted
to an unconstitutional encroachment upon the religious character of
the schools. 11 7 The court viewed unions as trespassors into the
heretofore absolute dominion of the bishops. 1 18 If certified, the
Unions would be entitled to participate in all employment related
decisions of the Employers.119
116 559 F.2d at 1123. In support of its alternative contention, the Board relied on its plenary
discretionary power to decide when an employer's operations affect commerce. See id. For a
discussion of the scope of the Board's jurisdictional powers, see notes 93-94 supra.
117559 F.2d at 1123-24. Mere certification of the Unions, the Board claimed, did not present
religion clause problems since an alleged constitutional injury must be more than conjectural.
Id. at 1126. Reliance was placed on Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937), where the
applicability of the NLRA to a news service employer was upheld over first amendment objections. 559 F.2d at 1126.
The Supreme Court, in Associated Press, refused to consider the employer's free press
argument, noting that the case squarely dealt with the discharge of an employee for union
activity. The union's allegation was unchallenged; the employer claimed an absolute right to be
free from any governmental restrictions. 301 U.S. at 131-32. The Court observed that "[clourts
deal with cases upon the basis of the facts disclosed, never with nonexistent and assumed circumstances." Id. at 132.
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Associated Press, noting that, unlike Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, the first amendment was never an issue. See 559 F.2d at 1126-27. The court remarked
that "[fQailure of a newspaper employee to carry out a publisher-employer's policy would not
bear on freedom of the press; a failure of a lay teacher to carry out a bishop-employer's policy
would directly interfere with the exercise of religion." Id. at 1127. The first amendment
infringements which the court perceived as "inevitably" arising from union certification rendered Associated Press inapposite. Id.
18 Id. at 1123. The opinion noted that the bishop derives his power from the canon law of
the church. Id. To require him to share " 'some decision-making' with the union[s]" would
violate that law. Id.
The court distinguished certain "permissible governmental impingements" with religious
autonomy. Id. at 1124. Government regulations "such as fire inspections ... [and] compulsory
school-attendance laws" were acknowledged as unavoidable interferences Id.The court, however, rejected the contention that the Board's regulations are analogous to these necessary government "contacts." Id. Adherence to essential government regulations was not seen as "ichibiting" church-teacher relations as Board regulation necessarily would. Id.
119 See id. at 1123. The court cited two law review articles on collective bargaining to support
its analysis. Id. Deemed important were conclusions drawn by both authorities to the effect that
the subjects of bargaining in teacher contracts "extend beyond the traditional scope of collective
bargaining," into matters intimately connected with the "educational and administrative
policies" of the institutions. Id.
It is noteworthy that the articles deal with collective bargaining at the college level. Kahn,
The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policy Making Through Adjudication, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 63, 64-65 (1973); Brown, Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 67
MIcH. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (1969). No evidence was introduced to support the court's fear that
certification of the Unions would inevitably lead to a decrease in the Employers' power to
manage their schools. For a further discussion of the effect of the Board's collective bargaining
order, see notes 127-34 infra and accompanying text.
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In the court's opinion, the bargaining order would hamper the
bishops' ability to carry out their duties under church law.1 20 The
possibility of a bishop being adjudged guilty of an unfair labor practice while performing duties mandated by religious canons was mentioned as a possible consequence of unionization. 12 1 The court also
held that the order to bargain would have a "chilling" effect on the
bishops' freedom to direct "the religious mission of the schools." 122
To avoid confrontations with the Unions, the bishops would be obliged to tolerate conduct contradictory to Roman Catholic teachings.123 Moreover, if a bishop were to dismiss a Union employee for
religious reasons, he would be faced with the prospect of' long and
l2 4
costly Board proceedings.
The Seventh Circuit's resolution of the constitutional issue was
grounded on its determination that the mere act of union certification
violates the religion clauses. 125 An examination of the tests applied
559 F.2d at 1123; see notes 121-24 infra and accompanying text.
559 F.2d at 1123-24. Two hypothetical situations were discussed. Id. In the first, a bishop
terminates all union member contracts because "the union'[s] .. . policies and practices" are
deemed inconsistent with the sectarian nature of the schools. Id. at 1123. In the second, union
teachers are terminated to make room on the faculty for "religious-order teachers who ...
become available." Id. at 1123-24. The court relied on section 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act and
the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964), in concluding that an unfair labor practice verdict could result in either instance. 559 F.2d at 1124.
The pertinent sections of the Act define as "unfair labor practice[s] ,"any interference with
employees' rights to organize and bargain collectively, N.L.R.A. §§ 7, 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157,
158(a)(1) (1976), "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment," id. § 8(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976), and "refus[al] to bargain collectively with the [union] representatives,"
id. § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). In Burnup & Sims, the employer fired two union
members after incorrectly being informed that they had threatened to destroy company property. 379 U.S. at 21-22. The Supreme Court held the employer's conduct in violation of section
8(a)(1) of the Act, finding that the wrongful discharge was apt to discourage union activity regardless of the employer's "good faith" motive. Id. at 23-24.
122 559 F.2d at 1124. "To minimize friction ... the bishop [will be forced to] tailor his
conduct and decisions to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.' " Id.
123 See id.
124 Id. The court also noted that the Board's inquiry into the reasons for a religiously-based
discharge would entangle the Board in "the Church's religious policies and beliefs." Id.
In actual practice, it appears that the Board has been able to resolve unfair labor disputes
involving religiously associated employers without examining religious doctrines. See note 146
infra and accompanying text. It follows that an employer's duty to defend its position in a Board
proceeding involving wholly secular considerations cannot be in violation of the free exercise
clause. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the [defenses] must be rooted in religious belief"); Brown v. Dade Christian
Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977); Grutka v. Barbour, 549 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1977).
12 559 F.2d at 1123-24. The Seventh Circuit was of the opinion that this case involved both
religion clauses of the first amendment. Id. at 1131. The court observed that "[tlhere are substantial aspects .. .not only of sovereign involvement in the religious activity under the establishment clause but there is . . . also curtailment of the free exercise of religion." Id. Con120
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by the Supreme Court in deciding religion clause cases, however,
discloses no inherent first amendment violation in applying the Act's
provisions to the Employers. 12 6 The NLRA is religiously neutral
legislation designed to prevent interferences with "the free flow of
commerce."127 While the provisions of the Act requiring collective
bargaining may limit the bishops' power to unilaterally set the terms
of lay teachers' contracts, such a result does not violate the
128
Employers' free exercise rights.
In a recent case involving the free exercise clause, the Supreme
Court observed that a challenge to a "reasonable state regulation"
must be based on religious beliefs before first amendment protections
may be asserted.1 2 9 The concept of collective bargaining itself is not
contrary to the Employers' religious beliefs; in fact, the Employers
would not object to bargaining with janitors and other nonteaching
personnel.°3 0 Thus, unless the Board's requirement to bargain is unreasonable as applied to the Employers, the order does not violate
the free exercise clause. 1 3 1 The bargaining order merely compels the

sequently, the court restricted its decision to a finding that the NLRA was inapplicable to the
religious Employers based on the prohibitions of the first amendment religion clauses. See id.
126 See notes 129-55 infra and accompanying text.
In its analysis, the court of appeals looked beyond the effects of the collective bargaining
requirement to the future implications of Board jurisdiction. 559 F.2d at 1123--24. The court
relied heavily on the perceived "chilling" effect on the Employers' "free exercise" rights that
would result from the prospect of unfair labor confrontations with the Board. See id. at 1124.
The troubling aspect of this reasoning is that it appears the court is dealing in speculation.
The Supreme Court in Associated Press made it clear that cases are decided on their factual
merits and not on mere surmise. Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132. The NLRA does not prohibit any discharge save one motivated by union activity. Id. Religious employers are free to
dismiss an employee for religious reasons, subject only to the possibility of being required to
prove that it had acted in good faith. See notes 143-46 infra and accompanying text. Where a
union member was discharged both for legitimate religious reasons and union activity, the
Board would have a duty to defer to the religious authority of the employer in order to protect
its first amendment rights. See note 146 infra. Accordingly, as long as an employer does not
commit unfair labor practices, it should not be "chilled" by the prospect of defending itself in an
unfair labor practice proceeding.
127 N.L.R.A. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
128 See notes 129--34 infra and accompanying text.
129 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). The Court observed that if an objection to
governmental regulation is based on religious convictions "only ... interests of the highest
order and those not otherwise served can" justify the regulation. Id.
130 See POPE JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISTRA 8-9 (1961); Brief for the Employers, supra
note 2, at 24-25. Pope John XXIII recognized "that the right of workers alone, or of groups of
both workers and owners, to organize is a natural one." MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra at 9; see
THE ENCYCLICALS AND OTHER MESSAGES OF JOHN XXIII 255-56 (1964).
'1
The reasonableness of the collective bargaining requirement, as applied to industrial
employers, can be readily derived from an examination of the purposes of the Act. N.L.R.A.
§ 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). Congress' intention in passing the NLRA was "to eliminate the
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parties to bargain "in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment." 132 Moreover, it is important to note that the Employers are free to guard their absolute
religious authority by refusing to bargain over any subject that they
feel is protected by the first amendment.' 3 3 Consequently, the requirement to bargain collectively does not inhibit the bishops' religious authority and the order is a reasonable government regulation
134
as applied to the Employers.
Where government regulations are challenged on establishment
clause grounds, the Supreme Court applies a three-pronged constitutional test. 135 The NLRA undoubtedly has a "secular legislative purpose," and is therefore valid under the first criterion. The Seventh
Circuit found, however, that the Board's power to resolve unfair labor
disputes involving the religious Employers would result in excessive
entanglement in violation of the third prong of the test.13 6 The court
also perceived impending violations under the second prong of the
test, noting that unconstitutional advancement would result if the
Board were to deviate from established rules and yield to the reli1 37
gious authority of the Employers under any circumstances.
The NLRB had maintained that, in hearing unfair labor disputes
between the parties, it could restrict its inquiry to the alleged unlaw-

causes of certain substantial obstructions to . . . commerce . . . by encouraging . . . collective

bargaining." Id.
132 Id. § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). These are the only mandatory subjects of bargaining. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958).

The Board itself does not participate in the negotiations, and no terms or conditions are
forced upon the parties. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102-06 (1970); N.L.R.A. §
8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
133

Any final order issued by the Board as a result of an Employer's refusal to bargain could

automatically be challenged in the appropriate court of appeals. N.L.R.A. § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. §
160(f) (1976). Until judicially affirmed, the order would not bind the Employer. Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 36, 48-50 (1938). Since the Employers may always
resort to the "protective wall" of the religion clauses, the conclusion that the requirement to
bargain will detract from their religious authority seems unjustified.
134

Any resulting interference with the Employers' authority in strictly economic matters is

analogous to the "permissible governmental impingements" recognized by the Seventh Circuit,
and is justified by the legitimate secular objectives of the Act. 559 F.2d at 1124; N.L.R.A. § 1,
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
135 For a statement of the test, see text accompanying note 73 supra.
138 559 F.2d at 1125-26. For a discussion of this section of the court's analysis, see notes
138-46 infra and accompanying text.
137 See 559 F.2d at 1129-30. For a discussion of the court's rationale in this area, see notes
147-55 infra and accompanying text.
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ful activities, consciously disregarding any doctrinal matters. 138 The
13 9
court of appeals, however, was not persuaded by this position.
In the court's opinion, certain situations would undoubtedly arise
where the Board would be forced to determine whether an
employer's motive was truly rooted in religious doctrine or merely an
excuse to fire a teacher for union activities. 140 Such an inquiry
would require the Board to determine the authenticity of the doctrinal position advanced resulting in excessive entanglement between
14 1
the Board and the employer.
The Supreme Court, in analogous religion clause cases, has
acknowledged the government's right to determine the basic factual
question of' whether a religious position has been advanced in good
faith. 14 2 In United States v. Seeger, 143 the Court addressed the ability of' courts and other governmental agencies to inquire into the
legitimacy of a religion-based refusal to be inducted into the armed
forces.144 The principle was clearly stated "that while the 'truth' of a
belief' is not open to question, there remains the significant question
whether it is 'truly held.' This is the threshold question of' sincerity
which must be resolved in every case." 145 The law, as announced in
Seeger, is unquestionably applicable to the Board's position in an unfair labor practice dispute. Accordingly, it prohibits the Board from
making any determinations of' religious doctrine but does not forbid
factual inquiry to determine whether the Employers' position is sup14 6
ported by the weight of the evidence.
i 559 F.2d at 1125. If, however, it was determined that the NLRB was involving itself in
religious affairs, the solution to the problem, the Board argued, would lie in requiring it to
resolve disputes without considering religious issues, not in quashing its power to resolve labor
disputes. Id.
139
140

Id.
Id.

Id. For example, the court feared that where the particular religious precept involved
conflicted with the view of the general public, the Board would be hard-pressed to objectively
determine the "authenticity" of the Employer's position. See id.
142 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215-16 (1972); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944); Brown v. Dade Christian
Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1977).
141

143 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
144 Id. at 164-65.
145

Id. at 185. As the court noted, this question of sincerity is one of fact. Id.

146 See id. The Catholic Bishop court cited three unfair labor practice charges that had al-

ready been filed against one of the Employers as examples of situations where entanglement
would be unavoidable. 559 F.2d at 1125. The charges grew out of the Employer's refusal to
renew the contracts of three lay teachers. Id. In one case, the Employer defended the termination of the teacher on the grounds that she "'expos[ed] biology students to sexual theories of
Masters and Johnson.'" Id. In another, the claimed basis for termination was the teacher's
refusal to arrange a religion course according to the supervisors' directions. Id. In the third
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The Catholic Bishop court was unpersuaded by the NLRB's
theory that an accommodation could be made "'to the religious purposes of the school"' if, for example, a union member was dismissed
for committing heresy. 14 7 The court understood accommodation as
requiring detailed inquiry by the Board into the religious principles
involved, resulting in an unconstitutional entanglement. 14 8 The

case, the Employer contended that " 'the teacher married a divorced Catholic and was no
longer in good standing with the Church.' " Id.
Contrary to the appellate court's opinion, the Board apparently decided these disputes
without considering the validity of the church laws involved. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South
Bend, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 267 (1977). For example, in the case report involving the sexual
theories of Masters and Johnson, there is no mention of the validity of any church law. Id. at
270-71. The Board's inquiry centered around the facts which led to the teacher's termination.
Id. Based on the evidence presented, the Board concluded that the refusal to rehire was motivated in "substantial part" by the employee's union activities. Id. at 272. Consequently, the
teacher was ordered reinstated. Id. at 274.
This decision, however, raises first amendment problems of another sort. The Board proceeded according to its rule that a discharge, even " 'part[iallyl motivated by union activity ...
violat[es] ... the Act.' " Id. at 272. Thus, the NLRB did not find it necessary to determine
whether the Employer's religious reasons for the termination were asserted in good faith. Id.
Assuming, though, that the religious grounds were advanced in good faith, the Employer conceivably was forced to rehire someone whose teaching methods had violated church law. Such
an imposition upon the Employer would plainly seem to violate the first amendment.
The solution to this type of problem was proposed by Board counsel during oral arguments
in Catholic Bishop, 559 F.2d at 1128. There, counsel suggested that where a union member
was legitimately discharged for religious reasons, "the Board would be compelled 'to try to
make some reasonable accommodation' " in order to protect the Employer's first amendment
rights. Id. Thus, in the case involving the theories of Masters and Johnson, the Board should
have determined whether the Employer, absent the union activity, would have fired the lay
teacher solely on the religious grounds. Again, the decision could have been based on factual
inquiry, i.e., was the teacher reprimanded for the irreligious conduct; how long after the incident did the termination take place; is there a church law inconsistent with the theories of
Masters and Johnson. If the Board concluded that the teacher would have been terminated for
the religion-based reason alone, then it should have deferred to the Employer's unique religious
character and upheld the discharge as lawful. For a further discussion of the accommodation
issue, see notes 147-55 infra and accompanying text.
147 559 F.2d at 1127-29. The Board's attorney had acknowledged "that the First Amendment
[mandated that] the Board .. . take cognizance of this special kind of reason." Id. at 1128.
The court looked to earlier judicial interpretations of accommodation and concluded that
when first amendment rights are "adjust[ed] or ... compromise[d]" in any way, significant
constitutional issues will inevitably arise. Id, at 1128-29. A number of recent cases involving
religious accommodation in another area were cited to support the court's conclusion. Id. (citing
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516
F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975); Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal.
1977)).
148 559 F.2d at 1129. In the Seventh Circuit's opinion "[a] 'reasonable accommodation .
would .. .involve the necessity of explanation and analysis, and probably verification and justification, of the doctrinal precept involved." Id. Further, the court noted that before a bishop
could persuade the Board of the need for an accommodation to religious beliefs, he would have
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Seventh Circuit also noted that the accommodation position conflicts
with the Board's firmly rooted "principles applicable to all other
employers in the labor relations area." 149 Assuming the Board could
reasonably accommodate the Employers without excessive entanglement, the court inferred that such preferential treatment would constitute an impermissible advancement of religion. 150 The court concluded that it could not conceive of an unfair labor practice situation
in which an accommodation could be made "without someone's constitutional rights being violated."151
The Seventh Circuit's decision to exclude the religious
Employers from the applicability of the Act appears to involve far
greater establishment clause problems than would a decision allowing
the Board to make, "reasonable accommodations" to the Employers'
unique nature. At the expense of thousands of lay teachers' right to
unionize, the court carved a special religious exclusion out of valid
secular legislation without ever mentioning the establishment
clause. 152 Yet, when Board counsel suggested that a "'reasonable
accommodation"' may occasionally be necessary in order to maintain
a balance between the Employers' first amendment rights and the lay
teachers' rights under the Act, the court implied the arrangement

to prove the veracity of those beliefs. id. This task would be made all the more difficult by the
fact that certain beliefs of the Roman Catholic Church are not universally accepted. Id.
The Board's position in a case requiring an accommodation is no different than in any other
unfair labor practice case. The Board's decision on whether to accommodate the Employer
would rest on a factual determination of the actual reason for the discharge. See note 146 supra
and accompanying text.
149 559 F.2d at 1129. The court referred to judicially approved precedents applied in industry
which presumably would be unenforceable against the religious Employers. See id. at 1129-30.
It was noted that where an employee is terminated for both legitimate employment related
reasons and union activity, the discharge violates the Act. Id. at 1130. Also, the Supreme Court
has held that once a prima facie case has been established against an employer in an unfair labor
proceeding, the employer bears the burden of proving the validity of his actions. NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967), cited in 559 F.2d at 1129-30.
150 See 559 F.2d at 1129-30. Judge Sprecher, in a concurring
opinion, noted:
The Board's assertion of jurisdiction will have the effect of inhibiting the practice of
religion by regulating it, yet by conceding that this will inexorably force it to 'accommodate' and prefer religious employers and conversely to discriminate against
secular employers in like situations, it will in the constitutional sense 'establish' the
religions with which it deals.
Id. at 1131 (Sprecher, J., concurring).
151

Id. at 1130.

Id. at 1124. In 1977, the number of lay teachers employed in Catholic schools alone
exceeded 107,000. Official Catholic Directory, general summary at 1-2 (1977).
152
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would establish religion. 153 The two conclusions appear irreconcilable.
In its analysis of the accommodation issue, the court apparently
relied on the second prong of' the establishment clause test which
states that a regulation "must have a principal or primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion."154 The principal effect of a
"reasonable accommodation" by the Board would seem to be the protection of' the Employers' free exercise rights, not the advancement of
religion.' 55 Thus, a "reasonable accommodation" to the Employers'
religious character would not appear to unconstitutionally establish
religion.
The Seventh Circuit obviously presupposed that a grant of collective bargaining power to the lay teachers would necessarily lead to
increased financial burdens on Catholic schools.1 56 The court culminated its analysis by noting that schools which are forced to operate
without financial aid from government because of their religious nature should, for that very same reason, be permitted to escape the
strictures and inhibitions of the NLRA. 1 5 7 This claimed "evenhanded approach to justice," 158 however, appears overwhelmingly
weighted in favor of' the religious Employers. The potentiality of the
Employers incurring added expenses as a result of the collective bargaining order does not warrant their exclusion from otherwise legitimate governmental regulation. The essence of' the decision is the
affirmation of the Employers' absolute right to set the terms and conditions of teachers' employment contracts. The lay teachers remain at
the mercy of their Employers, forced not only to accept whatever
terms are offered them, but also left without any form of' job security.

559 F.2d at 1128-30.
See id. at 1130; Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977).
155 Recently, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the Supreme
Court implicitly affirmed the constitutionality of a "reasonable accommodation" requirement in
153

154

legislation designed to protect one's religious freedoms. Id. at 77; 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1977).
156 See 559 F.2d at 1130-31.
157 id. at 1130. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court, in denying financial
aid to parochial schools, has never declared that there are no constitutional means of providing
aid to these institutions. The Court has upheld the constitutionality of numerous statutes which
aid, albeit indirectly, this country's Roman Catholic schools. E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977) (statutes providing textbook loans, standardized testing, health services, and remedial
therapy to nonpublic school students); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (statutes granting tax exemptions to religious institutions); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (statute providing textbook loans to students in public and private schools). Hence, the Seventh
Circuit's depiction of these institutions as totally excluded from governmental assistance is misleading.
158 559 F.2d at 1131.
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This power imbalance between employer and employee is precisely
15 9
the type of inequity sought to be prevented by the NLRA.
Michael F. O'Neill
159 N.L.R.A. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). Section 1 of the Act states in part:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business
depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in
industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working
conditions within and between industries.
Id.

